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Abstract
Participants in U.S. markets for live cattle increasingly rely on federal grading
standards to price slaughtered animals. This change is due to the growing prominence of
grid pricing mechanisms that speciy explicit premiums and discounts contingent on an
animal’s graded quality class. Although there have been recent changes in the way cattle
are priced, the technology for sorting animals into quality classes has changed very little:
human graders visually inspect each slaughtered carcass and call a quality and yield
grade in a matter of seconds as the carcass passes on a moving trolley. There is anecdotal
evidence of systematic bias in these called grades across time and regions within U.S.
markets, and this paper empirically examines whether such claim is supported in a sample
of loads delivered to three different Iowa packing plants during the years 2000-02.
Keywords: cattle markets, grader bias, quality measurement.
GRADER BIAS IN CATTLE MARKETS?
EVIDENCE FROM IOWA
Introduction
The pricing of slaughter cattle in U.S. markets increasingly depends on carcass
quality attributes assigned through so-called grid pricing mechanisms (e.g., McDonald
and Schroeder, 2003; Whitley, 2002). The carcass attributes most widely employed for
this purpose include U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) quality and yield
grades. These two attributes are intended to reect meat palatability and the quantity of
usable meat on an animal in relation to total carcass weight, respectively. Although the
adoption of grid-based pricing mechanisms is a relatively recent occurrence, very little has
changed in the way the USDA grades carcasses. In the majority of commercially graded
cattle, grading is accomplished through visual inspection of each animal, without the aid
of physical measurement.
Naturally, there is grading error in this process. Modern slaughter and packing
facilities are highly focused on efciency and move carcasses through processing at a
rapid rate. As a result, graders are typically asked to assess the quality and yield attributes
of an individual carcass in less than 10 seconds, and grading error is an inevitable
occurrence. However, so long as this grading process is reasonably unbiased, or at least
consistently biased across time and location, it may be reasonable to expect little effect on
efciency or the distribution of returns in marketing cattle. The purpose of this paper is to
examine whether bias exists in a sample of loads delivered to three different Iowa packing
plants during the years 2000 to 2002, and, if so, to assess the direction and economic
consequence of this bias.
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The data that make this exercise possible (which we will describe in more detail)
include carcass measures, in addition to quality and yield grade, that allow computation of
the true yield grade. That is, we have data on individual animals delivered to various
packing plants for which we observe the USDA called yield grade and the true yield
grade. Although seemingly a simple matter (given this data), it turns out that measuring
grader bias is somewhat difcult. An econometrician or statistician usually uses the
term bias in reference to the difference between a sample estimate of some population
parameter, and the true population parameter. In contrast, the grading bias that interests
us is the difference between the distribution of called grades and true grades. Moreover,
even this comparison is not quite what we want since at present no grading technology can
costlessly measure true grade without error in the time frame demanded by current
processing standards. Thus, it is also necessary to develop some reasonable model of how
we think graders should perform and to compare the distribution of called grades with the
distribution predicted by this model. If these two distributions differ signicantly, then we
will say that grading is biased.
In what follows we briey describe the grading procedure that is carried out in U.S.
cattle markets and develop a formal model of bias estimation. We then describe our data
in greater detail and present results. The nal section discusses directions for future
research and summarizes our results.
Grading Procedures in U.S. Cattle Markets
Grading services offered by the USDA are voluntary and provided at cost to meat
packing rms upon request. Interestingly, meat grading was originally intended to be used
soley for meat-market reporting but it subsequently developed into a trading standard
(U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1997). At present, all meat packing rms employ USDA
graders in their facilities and rely on federal grade standards for the majority of their
trading.
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The quality grade of a beef carcass can be one of (in decreasing order of meat
palatability) the following: Prime, Choice, Select, Standard, Commercial, Utility, Cutter,
and Canner. Technically, the quality grade of an animal is determined as a function of the
degree of marbling (intramuscular fat) observed on the carcass, ranging from practically
devoid to slightly abundant, and the maturity (or age) class of the animal, the denition
of which varies across animal type (e.g., steer versus cow). In practice, however, maturity
is not known by graders, and marbling is not physically measured. Both traits are assessed
by focusing on the visual state of certain key parts of the carcass. In the denition of the
Prime quality grade, for example, an animal’s maturity class is determined in part by
observing ...slightly red and slightly soft chine bones and cartilages on the ends of the
thoracic vertebrae that have some evidence of ossication. Similarly, for this particular
maturity class, Prime requires a minimum slightly abundant amount of marbling, and
moderately rm ribeye muscle (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1997, p. 13). Thus, in
addition to the subjectivity inherent in the denition of quality grade, the grading process
itself is subject to additional subjectivity in the form of graders’ sensory assessment of the
relevant carcass attributes.
Yield grade is in principle dened more precisely than is quality grade. The USDA
denes yield grades 1 (best) through 5 (worst) using a well-established prediction
equation relating various carcass characteristics to a yield index (where yield refers to
usable meat in relation to total carcass weight), together with a grading rule that species
the intervals of the yield index that represent a distinct yield grade. The equation used by
USDA is
predicted yield = 2.50 + 2.5× fat thickness+ 0.20×kph
+ 0.0038×weight−0.32× ribeye area, (1)
where kph refers to kidney, pelvic, and heart fat. Yield grade is then 1 for predicted
yield strictly less than 2.0; 2 for predicted yield between 2.0 and 2.99; 3 for predicted
yield between 3.0 and 3.99; 4 for predicted yield between 4.0 and 4.99; and 5 otherwise.
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In practice, however, this equation is never used during commercial grading operations.
Instead, graders are asked (and trained) to assess visually key points of the carcass and to
call a grade, 1 to 5, in a matter of seconds. For example, although there are slightly
different criteria specied depending on the apparent size of the animal, a yield-grade 1
animal ...usually has only a thin layer of external fat over the ribs, loins, rumps, and clods
and slight deposits of fat in the anks and cod or udder. There is usually a very thin layer
of fat over the outside of the rounds and over the tops of the shoulders and necks. Muscles
are usually visible through the fat in many areas of the carcass (U.S. Department of
Agriculture, 1997, p. 11).
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 1  2  3  4  5
Called
Actual
FIGURE 1. Unconditional called versus actual yield-grade distribution
Thus, as with quality grade, there is signicant subjectivity in the call of an animal’s
yield grade by USDA graders. Nevertheless, an interesting difference between quality and
yield grade is the ability, at least in principle, to measured precisely yield-grade given
adequate time and resources and hence to compare graders’ called yield with actual yield.
Such a comparison is provided in Figure 1, where we plot histograms of called and actual
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grades for the data in our sample. We describe the source and generation process for these
data in a subsequent section, but for now it is sufcient to note the apparent difference
between called and actual yield-grade distributions. USDA graders tend to call slightly
fewer 1’s, 2’s, and 4’s than actually occur, but also tend to call more 3’s. Yield-grade 5’s
rarely occur, nor are they called often.
Of course, the histograms in Figure 1 mask important information regarding the
nature of grading error. For example, it is impossible to tell from this gure if graders call
more 3’s than actually occur because they mistakenly call 3 when yield grade is actually 2,
or if instead they mistakenly call 3 when yield grade is actually 1, 4, or 5. To better
understand the nature of grading error in our sample, Table 1 presents the distribution of
called grade conditional on actual grade. Later in the paper, we refer to this as the
conditional error distribution of called grades.
Table 1 makes clear that graders error away from the endpoints of the distribution.
When yield grade is actually 1 or 5, graders tend more often to call 2 and 4, respectively.
Similarly, graders are far more likely to call 3 rather than 1 when yield grade is actually 2,
and to call 3 rather than 5 when yield grade is actually 4. The unconditional mean yield of
animals in our sample is 2.78, so another way to interpret the apparent bias of graders is
to say that they error toward the mean.
TABLE 1. Distribution of called yield grade conditional on actual yield grade
Called Yield
Actual Yield 1 2 3 4 5
1 .41 .49 .10 0 0
2 .04 .68 .28 0 0
3 .01 .15 .83 .01 0
4 0 .01 .58 .40 .01
5 0 0 .25 .63 .13
This is not surprising given the task that graders perform. With limited time to call
yield grade, and with no supporting physical measures of the relevant carcass attributes,
6 / Hueth, Lawrence, and Marcoul
graders must estimate the yield index (and then perform the relevant calculation
converting the yield index into yield grade). In carrying out such an estimation, and given
graders’ prior knowledge of the yield-grade distribution, it may be efcient to err in the
manner observed in Table 1. Thus, without specifying some model of how we think
graders ought to behave, it is impossible to conclude from the information in Figure 1 and
Table 1 that graders are biased, or to evaluate graders’ efcacy in any other fashion.
Moreover, thus far we have documented apparent differences in the distributions of called
and actual yield grades without saying anything about the economic and statistical
signicance of these differences. In the next section, we develop a behavioral model of
grading that will allow us to address these questions.
Measuring Grader “Bias”
Suppose that graders, upon observing a carcass, receive an unbiased signal s of the
carcass’s true yield y. Without loss of generality we can write s = y + ε with E[ε] = 0 and
E[ε2] = σ2. To makes things empirically tractable, we will assume that y is distributed
independent of ε and that both variables are normally distributed with the mean and
variance of y given by µ and σ2y , respectively. Then s and y are jointly normally distributed
with correlation coefcient ρ = σy/(σ + σy)1/2.
There are a variety of ways in which we might expect graders to behave, but from a
normative perspective they ought to make use of their signals in forming an estimate of y.
Perhaps the simplest strategy a grader might pursue is to form an estimate of the true yield
index y, conditional on the signal he observes, and then base his called yield grade on this
estimate. Under the maintained assumption that graders know the true distribution of the
yield index,1 and given our assumption on the joint distribution of y and s, a grader can
compute the expected value of y conditional on s using E[y|s] = µ + ρ2(s−µ). Having
performed this computation, the grader can then substitute E[y|s] for y into the USDA
yield-grade standard gs(y) = 5−∑5j=2 1{y< j} to yield the behavioral rule
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gb(s) = 5−∑5j=2 1{E[y|s]< j}. In what follows, we will assume that graders use this
strategy.2
If gb(s) (combined with the estimation of y conditional on s) is a reasonable
description of how graders behave, then it should yield predictions similar to what we
observe. As noted in the previous section, we are concerned both with the aggregate
distribution of called-grade outcomes and with the error distribution of called grades. To
see what is implied by this model of behavior, rst note that we can rewrite gb(s) as
gb(s) = 5−
5
∑
j=2
1{s< j( j,ρ,µ)}, (2)
where j( j,ρ,µ) = ( j− (1−ρ2)µ)/ρ2. Thus, an immediate consequence of gb(s) is that
graders will tend away from calling extreme grades. In particular, for all j < µ, expression
(2) implies j( j,ρ,µ)< j. In other words, graders using the rule gb(s) shade the grade
standard for a good yield grade (low y) by making the USDA standard more strict. An
analogous result holds for j > µ but in the opposite direction, in which graders shade the
grade standard for a bad yield grade (high y) by making the USDA standard more lax
( j( j,ρ,µ)> j).
Next, we would like to evaluate how this shading affects the likelihood of observing a
given called grade, in relation to the likelihood of observing the same true grade. Whether
or not this shading makes high- and low-yield grades more or less likely than what we
should expect given the population distribution for y and the use of the USDA grading
standards gs(y) also depends on the distribution for s. To answer this question, rst
consider Pr[gb(s) = 1]. For this comparison, note that under the USDA grading rule, and
for the given population distribution of y,
Pr[gs(y) = 1] = Pr[y< 2] = Φ
(
2−µ
σy
)
, (3)
where Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. In contrast, under the
behavioral rule gb(s),
Pr[gb(y) = 1] = Pr[s< j(2,ρ,µ)] = Φ
(
2−µ
ρσy
)
, (4)
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so that the behavioral rule is likely to yield fewer yield-grade 1’s than is the USDA rule,
provided µ> 2. A similar computation for yield grade 5 reveals that
Pr[gb(5) = 5] = 1−Φ((5−µ)/ρσy), which is lower than the likelihood of observing yield
grade 5 under the USDA rule provided that µ< 5. Thus, under the reasonable assumption
the mean of the population distribution for y lies somewhere in the model of the scale
dening the USDA yield grade, graders will tend to call too few 1’s and 5’s, relative to the
expected actual frequency of 1’s and 5’s. Moreover, if for some k, k < µ< k + 1, then
Pr[gb(s) = k] = Φ
(
k + 1−µ
ρσy
)
−Φ
(
k−µ
ρσy
)
>
Pr[gs(y) = k] = Φ
(
k + 1−µ
σy
)
−Φ
(
k−µ
σy
)
, (5)
so that graders will tend to call grade k more frequently than it will actually occur.
Thus, at least in terms of aggregate frequencies of occurrence for the various grades,
the behavioral rule gb(s) yields predictions that are broadly consistent with observed
called grades. We are also interested in assessing the extent to which gb(s) results in a
conditional error distribution qualitatively similar to that in Table 1. To do so, we need to
choose a particular parameterization for the joint distribution of y and s. In the next
section, we rst present a brief description of our data and then describe a strategy for
choosing this parameterization using maximum likelihood. To the extent that we are able
to reproduce the error distribution in Table 1, we will conclude that graders are unbiased
or at least that they seem to be using a reasonable behavioral rule.
Empirics
Data
The data for our analysis come from a sample of loads delivered to three different
packing plants in Iowa during the years 2000 to 2002. During this period, a small group of
southern Iowa cattle producers payed a third party to collect carcass attributes of their
slaughtered animals beyond those reported in grid-pricing closeout sheets. In particular,
for each animal delivered by participating producers, the third party measured and
Grader Bias in Cattle Markets / 9
reported (among other things) the characteristics needed to compute the actual yield index
according to equation (1), and USDA quality and yield grades.
This sample is not randomly selected and thus potentially not representative of all
loads delivered to the relevant plants. Results subsequently reported should be interpreted
with this caveat in mind. Another potential caveat is the possibility that the presence of
third parties (payed by cattle producers) altered graders’ behavior. However, discussions
with plant and USDA representatives suggest this is not a concern. The total number of
animals delivered by the producers in our sample represents a small fraction of the total
animals graded on any given day, and moreover it is not uncommon for producers to
request measurement of carcass attributes beyond yield and quality grade.
Table 2 summarizes the data in our sample. Overall, we have observations on 3,841
graded carcasses, including 501 animals delivered to Plant A, 1,431 delivered to Plant B,
and 1,909 delivered to Plant C. With the exception of deliveries to Plant A in 2001,
yield-grade 2 accounts for roughly 40 percent of graded carcasses. There is slighly more
variation across years and plants for yield-grade 3 calls, but in over half of the cases
reported in Table 2, yield-grade 3 accounts for at least 50 percent of graded carcasses.
Yield-grade 1 is called on between 1 and 15 percent of graded carcasses, and yield-grade 4
is called on 2 percent or less of graded carcasses, with notable exceptions in Plant B
during years the 2000 and 2002. Yield-grade 5 is called on an almost negligible number of
graded carcasses.
TABLE 2. Data summary
Animals with Plant A Plant B Plant C
Yield Grade 2000 2001 2002 2000 2001 2002 2000 2001 2002
1 0.01 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.15 0.08 0.03 0.09 0.05
2 0.42 0.66 0.36 0.47 0.46 0.49 0.40 0.39 0.40
3 0.55 0.27 0.57 0.43 0.38 0.41 0.55 0.52 0.54
4 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.23 0.00 0.17 0.02 0.00 0.00
5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00
Total Animals 238 183 80 546 143 742 1119 221 569
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In the following section, we evaluate whether the called grades summarized in Tables
1 and 2 can be plausibly generated by graders’ employing the behavioral rule gb(s)
discussed in the previous section.
Estimation
Our basic unit of observation is a graded carcass, and we index these n(= 3841)
observations by i. Of course, the signal (s) observed by the grader is an unobserved latent
variable from the perspective of an econometrician. We denote the carcass yield
(estimated via equation (1)) associated with each observation by yi, and the USDA called
grade by gi. In addition, associated with the ith observation is a Kvector of
characteristics xi that conditions the distribution of yi. For tractability, we assume these
characteristics affect only the location of the distribution for yi.
Given these assumptions, our endogenous variable gi is related to yi and xi according
to the relationship
gi = 5−
5
∑
j=2
1{xiβ + ρ2(yi + εi− xiβ)< j}, (6)
where β is a vector of parameters that affect the mean value of yi. Given this relation, we
can compute the probability of observing any given grade, conditional on the unknown
parameters θ = (ρ,β,σε). In particular, dening εi( j,θ) = ( j− xiβ)/ρ2 + xiβ− yi, we can
write the log likelihood for observation i as
`(θ|gi,yi,xi) = 1{gi = 1} logΦ
(
εi(2,θ)
σε
)
+ 1{gi = 5} logΦ
(
1− εi(5,θ)
σε
)
+
4
∑
k=2
1{gi = k} log
(
Φ
(
εi(k + 1,θ)
σε
)
−Φ
(
εi(k,θ)
σε
))
. (7)
We will estimate the unknown parameters θ through maximization of this likelihood
and will compare the conditional error distribution of the rule gb(s) under these
parameters with that in Table 1.
Results
To estimate the parameter vector θ, we ignore heterogeneity across plants and years
and concentrate the likelihood in (7) with the sample mean for y as our estimate of µ. We
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further (somewhat arbitrarily) choose σε to be 1. Because the value of ρ is not of interest
in itself, we whether we get an unbiased estimate of this parameter is unimportant.
Instead, we are interested in knowing how well the behavioral rule gb(s) (conditional on
observed yield indices yi) can replicate the distribution of called grades gi.
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FIGURE 2. Unconditional and conditional called versus predicted grades (lightly
shaded bars correspond to called values; darkly shaded bars correspond to predicted
values)
Maximizing the expected value of the likelihood in (7) yields an estimate for ρ of
0.82. The predicted distribution of grades at this value of ρ (and for µ = 2.78 and σε = 1)
is presented in Figure 2. The rst box in this gure, labeled Unconditional, contains
called frequencies and predicted probabilities for each grade. Overall, the model does a
remarkably good job of predicting the aggregate frequency of 1’s and 4’s called by USDA
graders, but it predicts too many 2’s and too few 3’s.
The remaining boxes in Figure 2 contain the conditional error distributions for called
and predicted grades. When actual grade is 1 or 2, USDA graders call more 3’s than are
predicted by our behavioral model. This tends to benet packers who receive relatively
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high-quality animals at a low-quality price. Interestingly, when true yield grade is 3 or 4,
USDA graders do a better job of prediction than does our behavioral model. Graders seem
to be able to recognize yield grade 3 and 4 animals. When true yield grade is 5, USDA
graders call more 5’s and fewer 4’s than predicted by our behavioral model, but they also
tend to call more 3’s. Of course, this benets growers who potentially receive a relatively
high price for low-quality animals. However, there are very few observations
corresponding to an actual grade of 5, so comparison of called and predicted error
distribution conditional on this grade is potentially misleading.
Given these results, it seems reasonable to conclude that USDA graders are not
obviously biased. There is weak evidence of bias when actual grades are 1 or 2. An
obvious next step for in our analysis is to examine whether the error distributions observed
in Figure 2 are statistically different. If so, we can then examine the extent to which the
grading bias observed for actual yield grades 1 and 2 are also economically signicant.
Conclusion
This paper uses data from a sample of loads delivered to three different packing plants
in Iowa to examine empirically the extent to which USDA graders are biased in their
assessment of yield grade. Our data contain carcass characteristics sufcient to compute
the true yield grade, which we then compare with USDA called grade for each of 3,841
graded carcasses. In our analysis, we dene bias in reference to a behavioral grading
rule that species how graders call grades, given imperfect observation of true yield.
Overall, we nd that our behavioral rule is capable of explaining important qualitative
features of the observed distribution of called grades. Most importantly, our model allows
for grading error. When the actual grade is 1, for example, graders often call a grade of 2
or 3. Our behavioral model captures this feature, though in this particular case it predicts
too many 3’s and not enough 2’s. When the actual yield grade is 3 or 4, USDA graders
actually do a better job of calling grades than our model predicts. To the extent that USDA
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graders err, they seem to do so in a way that benets packers, though we have not yet
evaluated the economic or statistical signicance of this effect.
Endnotes
1. Graders typically observe hundreds of carcasses per day and presumably have a good
sense of the distribution of quality, though the exact quality of any given carcass cannot be
observed.
2. Alternatively, the grader might instead choose k to maximize the probability that the
actual grade is k, conditional on the observed signal s. That is, for each k ∈ [1, . . . ,5], the
grader might compute Pr[actual grade = k|s] and then choose the argmax from this set of
probabilities. This is perhaps a more sensible strategy, though it is also a more
computionally burdensome strategy for grader to employ. The probability of each possible
actual grade must be computed and then the largest of these selected. In contrast, the
strategy described previously requires computation of a single expectation, and this
uniquely determines the called grade. In any case, the purpose of the present paper is to
examine whether called grades are consistent with some reasonable behavioral model. We
leave exploration of alternative behavioral rules that might better explain USDA grader
behavior for future research.
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